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Platform Lending and the Politics of Financial Infrastructures 
  
 
Online platform lending is typically understood as a challenge to incumbent banking 
institutions. Since its inception platform lending has been closely associated with particular 
financial and digital technological innovations that are thought to be changing how people 
engage in lending and borrowing around the world. In this article, I emphasise the deeply 
political aspect of these innovations. I claim that the platform lending model is built on the 
ostensible ‘infrastructural quality’ of credit providers across a number of national contexts. 
This helps explain why platform lending has emerged in its current form and why the firms 
involved tend to have a certain attachment to and association with the perceived merits of 
financial inclusion policy initiatives. The article further seeks to show that this 
infrastructural quality is politically contestable. When the politics of claims to infrastructure 
are taken seriously it is possible to demonstrate how platform lending, in spite of the 
‘alternative’ and ‘democratising’ discourses that surround the sector, is in fact built upon a 
particular set of political state and business-led agendas that essentially further entrench 
widespread dependence on debt.  
 
Financial infrastructures, platform lending, financial inclusion, platform capitalism, 
alternative finance. 
 






The globalisation of ‘alternative finance’ has increased rapidly in recent years. Often aimed 
at serving a common financial inclusion agenda around the world, platform lending 
constitutes a sizable part of this process through the promise of harnessing the supposed 
gains of disintermediating ‘mainstream finance’. In this article, the political settlement that 
deems credit provision part of the necessary infrastructure of contemporary societies – the 
primary means through which platform lending is able to rapidly expand– is problematised 
through an analysis of the flawed conceptions of alterity, democracy and disintermediation 
on which the industry is built. The politics of claims to infrastructure are foregrounded, 
allowing for a discussion of the complex and often obscured set of power relations, 
practices, and socio-technical systems that constitute platform lending. Though in infancy 
and involving an uncertain set of social relations, platform lending could be suggestive of 
a tendency that fuels credit bubbles and increases reliance on socially harmful forms of risk 
assessment, while broadening and deepening a problematic dependence on debt-fuelled 
consumption-based growth and development models. 
Over the last decade, lending and borrowing through specialist online platforms, 
particularly those based in the US, the UK and China, has grown to the extent that it is 
now changing the character of consumer and business lending. Loan origination volumes 
attract the attention of ‘traditional’ lenders, such as major banks and credit card companies 
(FCA 2016: 35). Wall Street and City of London firms have taken direct stakes in online 
lending firms and set up platforms in-house to compete with newer ‘fintech’ firms. The 
rationale for Goldman Sachs establishing their platform ‘Marcus’ was given by CEO Lloyd 
Blankfein: ‘the world kind of favors lending over a lot of other activities that we do’ (CNBC 
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2017). It was used to lend out over US$1 billion in consumer loans within the first eight 
months of operation.  
Online alternative finance platforms have expanded rapidly based on the ostensible 
benefits presented by emergent forms of digital and mobile technologies. Between 2011-
16, £10.6 billion market transaction volume was intermediated by online alternative finance 
platforms in the UK (CCAF 2017a: 12). Between 2014-2016 the corresponding figure for 
the US was US$75.6 billion, while China between 2013-2016 continued to be the world’s 
largest alternative finance market with a total volume of US$242.3 billion (CCAF 2017b: 
26; 2017c: 24). Total market volumes are much lower across the Middle East and Africa, 
US$358.87 million in 2016 (with Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya constituting the largest 
markets), but the outlook for these regions is typically one of optimism about potential 
growth (CCAF 2018a: 8). For instance, the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance 
(2018a: 31) depicts a widely-held outlook:  
 
Disrupters in this space are using artificial intelligence, big data, and other 
revolutionary capabilities to spur financial inclusion and improve access to finance 
for those who will otherwise be left behind … The increasing connectivity, mobile 
penetration and growing economies of the Middle East and Africa hold vast 
opportunities for the development of alternative financial instruments, and the time 
for dynamic growth has arrived. 
 
Industry insiders, regulators and sympathetic commentators tend to stress the novelty of 
the uses to which digital data sources can be put, especially in terms of improving access 
to financial services (Lyman 2014; WEF 2017: 108). Emerging digital data sources parallel 
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the rapid rise in industry interest in Big Data analytics, particularly as they can be applied 
in financial practices (Campbell-Verduyn, Goguen and Porter 2017). Though their 
integration into broader financial practices remains piecemeal at present, such digital 
‘innovations’ can also be understood in terms of a deepening of the financialisation of 
everyday life through mobile and online activity, as an ‘integration of capital not only with 
individuals’ every desire but also with their everyday social lives’ (Tiessen: 2015: 878). 
The focus of this article is on online platform lending specifically, which makes up 
the largest proportion of alternative finance activities (CCAF 2017a: 13; 2017b: 29; 2017c: 
28). Both industry and regulators regularly suggest that online platform lending improves 
the efficiency of financial intermediation, which is usually though not always conceived as 
one of the core functions of banks (Oxera 2016: 7). The Governor of the Bank of England 
Mark Carney (2018: 5) has discussed this within the context of how the UK economy ‘is 
reorganising into a series of distributed peer-to-peer connections across powerful 
networks’. The Bank is attempting create ‘the new hard and soft infrastructure that the new 
finance will require’ in a world in which ‘Data is the new oil’ (Carney 2018: 5).  
Both financial regulators and more critical studies in IPE and beyond have 
examined the growth of digital financial technologies to bring about ‘financial inclusion’ 
(Aitken 2015a; Gabor and Brooks 2017; Mader 2016; Roy 2012). As a core organising 
assemblage, financial inclusion allows both state-led programmes and the business models 
of private firms to be organised around furthering specific market-oriented goals, such as 
access to credit and financial literacy education (Clarke 2015). Indeed, the Bank for 
International Settlements and Financial Stability Board (BIS/FSB 2017: 30) state that a ‘key 
policy implication of FinTech credit [platform lending] is its potential to foster financial 
inclusion’. For advocates, financial inclusion is a means through which to access ‘modern’ 
 6 
economic citizenship by smoothing consumption cycles. For critics, it is better understood 
as a set of practices that create hierarchical relations based on debt, justified through the 
supposed need to expand marketisation and individualism (Soederberg 2014).  
I argue that while online lending platforms design their operations in opposition to 
established banks, they do so through means of instituting business models that are 
premised on capturing a certain infrastructural quality. This means that even though the 
language of ‘disruption’ and financial ‘democratisation’ surrounds the industry, the 
situation is actually one of firms reproducing some of the problems associated with 
conventional finance. Such problems include fuelling credit bubbles through an in-built 
dependence on credit growth, socially harmful forms of risk assessment that make 
individuals objects of intervention, and the capacity to broaden and deepen a dependence 
on debt in national growth models. These tendencies can be better understood if greater 
attention is brought to the political nature of what tends to be presented as a merely 
‘technical’ settlement that supposes that credit provision is part of a necessary 
infrastructure. The growing attachment to financial inclusion initiatives around the world 
is, at least in part, responsible for cementing the strength of this political settlement.  
The foundational starting point for this article is the contention that financial 
inclusion policies and, crucially, how they are increasingly being underpinned by new 
financial technologies, deserve continued critical attention for at least three reasons. First, 
the ways in which private firms are involved in bringing ever-greater populations at and 
beyond the ‘fringes’ of finance into its formal realms are crucial to understanding the 
accumulation dynamics of contemporary financialised capitalism. Specifically, the 
approximately 50% of adults worldwide who are ‘unbanked’ and have no relationship to 
formalised finance are increasingly targeted as objects of knowledge and intervention 
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(Aitken 2015a: 5). Second, and relatedly, there are important consequences of such trends 
in the making of indebted subjects, not least in the context of broader recognition of the 
centrality of the creditor-debtor relation to contemporary capitalism (Lazarrato 2012). 
Third, conversations continue about the limits of neoliberalism and indeed the limits of 
specific neoliberal policy agendas, such as financial inclusion, that are often not successful 
even on their own terms (see Bernards, this issue).  
In this article, I suggest that the rise of platform lending serves to demonstrate how 
financial inclusion as a set of practices promoted by a broad coalition of policy makers and 
businesses at the national and international level is part of a political consensus – 
sometimes referred agreement over an accepted ‘growth model’ (Gamble 2009) – in which 
certain financial services, in particular providers of credit, are deemed to be part of the 
basic ‘infrastructures’ of contemporary societies across the Global North and Global 
South. In other words, the design and growth of platform lending is built on a state-
endorsed view that lending and borrowing is, and should be, at the core of contemporary 
capitalism and that providers of credit collectively have a basic infrastructural quality similar 
to providers of transport, electricity, or water supply systems. When providers of credit are 
enabled to constitute a form of ‘infrastructure’ in this way, this allows for particular groups 
and businesses, in this case the platform lending industry, to profit at the expense of people 
who become increasingly indebted as a result of the discourses and practices surrounding 
financial inclusion policies. This echoes Susan Strange’s (1990: 264) argument about how 
the application of certain technologies is facilitated by specific regulatory projects. Without 
doubt, the financial services industry in general benefits from state promotion of financial 
inclusion, yet as I will argue the platform lending industry is uniquely positioned to benefit 
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from this agenda because of the close association between emerging digital financial 
technologies and new forms of credit scoring ‘risky’ borrowers.  
The goals, merits and outcomes of financial inclusion agendas are politically 
significant, as a number of important contributions to the critical study of finance 
demonstrate (Gabor and Brooks 2017; Soederberg 2014). Yet the business models of 
platforms are dependent upon the ability to act as if credit provision has an infrastructural 
quality, endorsed and supported by a number of major states and private firms promoting 
financial inclusion. In the broader context of debt-based consumption-driven growth and 
development models in which microcredit, payday lending and credit card debt play a 
central role in supporting economic activity, it might be very difficult for ordinary people 
to do much else than depend on debt to meet social provisioning needs (Roberts 2013). 
Potentially this means that borrowers, in a digital lending context, have every reason to 
willingly submit to the demands and techniques of digital credit assessment. Such 
submission is not without political significance, in particular when it comes to surrendering 
privacy, as well as autonomy over one’s position as a financial subject. 
To make this argument, the article proceeds as follows. First, the emergence of 
platform lending is discussed in the context of an approach that mobilises an infrastructural 
lens inspired by literature from Science and Technology Studies (STS) and the related Social 
Studies of Finance. In particular, the suitability of an emphasis on infrastructure is outlined 
along with the socio-technical formation of the platform and its positioning within finance. 
Second, the formation and positioning of platform lending as a specific set of practices is 
examined in relation to wider financial inclusion goals. The core issue explored here is how 
the intermediation function of platform lending is linked to notions of lending and 
borrowing as foundational to contemporary modes of living. Finally, a discussion of the 
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platform lending industry and its practices is used to demonstrate how the entanglement 
of platform lending and financial inclusion, first, produces particular and potentially 
harmful developments through credit-scoring technologies and, second and relatedly, 
facilitates the intensification of the financialisation of everyday life and social provisioning.  
The core empirical material on which this article is based consists of participant 
observation at over ten financial technology industry and regulatory conferences and 
workshops that took place primarily in London and San Francisco between 2014-2017, as 
well as anonymous off-the-record interviews with practitioners working at platform 
lending firms and associated US and UK regulatory bodies, supported by desk-based 
research. This approach allowed for the most direct engagement with the relational 
position of platform lending as a set of actors, technical objects and socio-economic 
practices. It also allowed for critical engagement with the materiality, spatiality and potential 
power of platform lending, which are key themes for studying financial infrastructures (see 
Bernards and Campbell-Verduyn, this issue). The wider implication of the arguments made 
is that there is a complex and often obscured set of power relations, practices, and socio-
technical systems involved in platform lending, which shows how certain configurations 
of state and non-state actors position access to credit as a central part of a necessary critical 
infrastructure, as well as how such notions of infrastructure are politically contestable, 







Platform lending as infrastructure 
 
First emerging in the mid-2000s as a form of ‘social finance’, online lending platforms are 
increasingly significant players in finance (Aitken 2015a; Rogers and Clarke 2016). As a 
working group of the BIS and FSB (2017: 1) advises, official data on platform lending, 
what it calls ‘FinTech credit’, is limited primarily because quantitative analyses of alternative 
finance in general tend to be based on disclosures from platforms themselves and non-
official sector surveys. As a still emerging form of finance, volumes as a proportion of total 
global financial activity are like to be very small. Nevertheless, platform lending activity has 
grown rapidly in recent years from a very low base.  The BIS/FSB (2017: 6) working group 
report that between 2013-15 the volume of new credit expanded by multiples of four or 
more in the largest markets such as China, the US and the UK, and at a similar rate in 
smaller markets from an even lower level of activity. Platforms have different areas of focus 
but the majority of lending tends to be either in the form of unsecured consumer credit, 
which accounted for 61% of the US alternative finance market in 2016, used for such 
things as debt consolidation (often student debt), emergency expenditures and 
consumption, or SME funding and small business credit, which is particularly notable as 
the largest market segment in the UK reaching £1.23 billion in 2016 (CCAF 2017b: 56; 
CCAF 2017a: 10). Real estate lending secured on property is also a rapidly growing area of 
activity, reaching £1.15 billion in the UK in 2016 (CCAF 2017a: 12). Firms like Prosper 
and Lending Club in the US, Lufax and CreditEase in China, Zopa and Funding Circle in 
the UK, and Lendbox and i-Lend in India, are all becoming recognised names in consumer 
and small business lending and are subject to significant attention in the business press. 
The series of bank failures and scandals that have taken place since 2007 have fostered 
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renewed interest in innovative and ‘alternative’ forms of lending and borrowing (Clarke 
and Tooker 2018). Platforms have attempted to use the apparent unpopularity of major 
banks in light of successive crises to capture some of their market share.  
The platform lending model can be characterised as follows. At a basic level, 
platforms create an online facility that allows investors (lenders) to find and lend funds to 
borrowers through agreements (that is, loan contracts) arranged by the platform (Oxera 
2016: 5). Borrowers are individuals in P2P consumer lending and firms in P2P business 
lending. The matching function performed by the platforms can take two forms. The 
original form, now less common, provided a novel means through which the interest rates 
for loans could be set through interaction between lenders and borrowers. For instance, 
the original Zopa model used a reverse-auction mechanism that allowed borrowers to post 
interest rates for the funds they wanted to borrow. In turn, investors would bid to fund 
posted loans at offered interest rates based on individual assessments of borrower profiles. 
By contrast the more dominant form of matching, which became the industry standard 
across P2P and marketplace lending particularly in the US and UK, is based on a model 
that relies on the platform setting the interest rate for investors and borrowers. In this 
model the platform is also responsible for allocating investments to different loans so that 
an investor’s funds are auto-allocated to a portfolio of loans (Oxera 2016: 5). As such, the 
linking together of lender and borrower funds is not strictly speaking a ‘direct’ form. That 
is, the lender does not have direct control over where their funds are invested and does 
not have direct interaction with the borrower as some platforms originally allowed. The 
evolution of the P2P lending model was signalled by industry players who rebranded their 
operations as ‘marketplace lending’. 
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Across the different models, platforms undertake a series of operational functions 
to facilitate lending and borrowing. Some functions are similar to those undertaken by 
banks and other mainstream lenders. These include such tasks as customer verification, 
payment processing, loan performance reporting, debt collection and legal compliance. 
Other functions are more distinct to platform lending (Oxera 2016: 6). These include: (1) 
credit risk assessment based on the latest digital data sources (which are used by other 
lenders but have a particular relationship with platforms); (2) ‘buffer’ funds designed to 
cover investor losses (but which are not a form of deposit protection); (3) the creation of 
secondary markets (allowing borrowers to exit loan investments); and (4) offering special 
services to borrowers (such as helping them put forward loan propositions). It is difficult 
to make generalised claims about the platform lending industry because of the diversity of 
firms involved, but this distinction between more conventional and novel operations in the 
platform lending industry provides useful starting points of comparison with more 
traditional lenders. 
For industry insiders, the key point of differentiation between platform and bank 
lending is framed around the issue of disintermediation. The enablement of lending from 
investor funds directly to borrowers in need of funds, which is what is meant by the original 
label ‘peer-to-peer’, is said to be part of the bypassing of banks. While a whole range of 
business commentators, management consultants and economists play a role in producing 
this image, some of the most dominant framings of the sector are fashioned by the firms 
that operate platforms themselves. Undoubtedly this is a form of marketing and an attempt 
at product differentiation, yet the platform lending concept also has been seized on by 
other firms in order to launch similar platforms, including major global banks such as 
Goldman Sachs mentioned above. The platform Zopa (2017) claims ‘to do things 
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differently … [by] directly match[ing] people looking for a low rate loan with investors 
looking for a higher rate of return … so everyone is better off”. Such claims are at the core 
of the public face of platform lending. At an international online lending industry 
conference, a CEO of a major platform insisted that their model allowed for a certain kind 
of equality between fund providers and borrowers (anonymous interview 2016). They 
framed this in terms of both sides of the creditor-debtor relation benefitting from the 
supposed efficiency gains of directly matching investor funds with borrower need.  
The apparent simplicity of platform lending echoes more longstanding notions of 
informal lending and community finance. In a study of early forms of online P2P lending, 
Michael Hulme and Collette Wright (2006: 7) suggested that ‘notions of the individual 
within community, transparency and broader ethicality are fundamental to Social Lending 
schemes’. They drew parallels between P2P lending as a form of social lending and the 
activities of the friendly societies dating back in Britain to the 1630s (Hulme and Wright 
2006: 13). What is notable about such comparisons, and those that could also be considered 
between P2P lending and other forms of credit associations, savings cooperatives, and so 
on, is that it is the digital platform aspect of the lending process that is primarily identified as 
representing difference here. In other words, the type of interaction between lenders and 
borrowers that platform lending facilitates has a much longer history than the activity of 
P2P or platform lending, per se. The core claim made by enthusiasts is that the particular 
character of the platform technologies enables more ‘horizontal’ forms of lending as 
compared to the ‘vertical’ relations of powerful financial institutions and their consumers 
(Coeckelbergh 2016: 169). To be clear, this is the claim of industry insiders and sympathetic 
commentators prevalent at major international conferences and public events. Yet it is one 
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that should be problematised in the context of discussions of the place of platform lending 
within debates about emergent financial infrastructures.  
Taking up the invitation offered by the editors of this special issue (see Bernards 
and Campbell-Verduyn, this issue) the lending platform be considered in light of debates 
about how socio-technical systems become imbued with a certain infrastructural character, 
as well as who and what drives such a process. Crucially, approaching infrastructures in 
this way as a heuristic device, allows for an analysis of how the digital platform interacts 
and combines with other old and new socio-technical systems. Recent work across a 
number of disciplines has made important contributions to understanding the online 
platform concept. ‘Platform capitalism’ more broadly across a range of economic circuits 
has recently been investigated (Langley and Leyshon 2016; Srnicek 2016), with implications 
for conceptualising the platform in financial practices. In this article, I focus specifically on 
platforms as socio-technical systems in the context of debates about emerging financial 
infrastructures. While I do not attempt to provide a comprehensive conceptual account of 
what is meant by infrastructures here, there are at least three reasons why an infrastructural 
lens is a useful approach to adopt. 
First, an emphasis on infrastructure – and claims to infrastructural status – allows 
for an exacting evaluation of the merits of arguments about the novelty of platform 
lending. Through the lens of an analysis of financial infrastructures, it is possible to assess 
what, if anything, the socio-technical formation of the platform changes about the politics 
of global finance. As ‘the infrastructure of the infrastructure’, the power of finance stems 
in part from its pivotal position in facilitating other circuits of economic activity (Cerny 
1994). Such a conceptualisation avoids a narrow methodologically individualist perspective 
that treats finance as a set of actors that can be formally modelled and instead focuses 
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attention on infrastructures of power based on observation of the crucial role finance plays 
in the contemporary world economy (Palan 2009: 391). While in a sense metaphorical in 
its mode of analysis, this interpretation of the role of financial intermediation in particular 
as infrastructural is useful for understanding the potential power of platform lending. In 
other words, there is a certain centrality to finance in contemporary capitalism conceived as 
infrastructure because it is vitally important in shaping how core political economic 
functions are undertaken. It is precisely the question of who and what gets to play the 
enabling role of facilitating other economic activity that is central to the design and 
functioning of the business models of platforms as they attempt to disintermediate banks. 
To study infrastructures in this way is thus to ask what they are made of and what kinds of social 
relations they ‘bundle together’ (Bernards and Campbell-Verduyn, this issue).  
Second, paying attention to the potential infrastructural quality of platform lending 
allows for the complex relational position of the platform, as a set of actors, technical 
objects and socio-economic practices facilitating the core function of extending credit, to 
be better understood. Conceived as infrastructure they are social and ‘technological 
projects’ performing organisational and governmental functions, while at the same time 
they are containers of ‘desire and fantasy’ that can be ‘wholly autonomous from their 
technical function’ (Larkin 2013: 328-329). On the one hand, the platform is a central 
enabler of economic activity with all the positional power this grants the operating firm. 
For instance, the platform performs the social conventions and practices associated with 
credit assessment and valuation, as well as providing the organisational technical devices 
for connecting users. In simple terms, it generates fee revenue from its position in financial 
circuits. On the other hand, platform lending as a practice is supposed to disintermediate 
banks, to allow the direct matching of surplus funds to borrower need. In this sense, the 
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platform does not so much perform an economic activity but allows others to do so, the 
facilitation characteristic of infrastructures, to ‘perfect’ market exchange by providing a 
marketplace for interaction. They are, at least in principle, part of the silent background 
system, the obscurity characteristic of infrastructures (Bernards and Campbell-Verduyn, this 
issue).  
Finally, building on the first issue of their socio-technical formation and the second 
their relational position, a focus on infrastructures allows for platforms to be better 
understood with regards to how other old and new financial infrastructures might facilitate 
and hinder that formation and positioning. While infrastructures are typically conceived as 
‘built systems’, it is perhaps more useful to think about the characteristics of infrastructures 
in more expansive terms according to their materiality, spatiality and power (see Bernards 
and Campbell-Verduyn, this issue). The systems of standardisation, valuation and 
convention that surround financial practices could hold just as much infrastructural quality 
as the electricity grids, computer networks and technical systems that make digitally-
mediated finance possible in a ‘physical’ sense. In terms of power, the ‘categorizing 
moment’ of defining what counts as infrastructure represents particular ‘epistemological 
and political commitments’ (Larkin 2013: 330). I want to stress that it is the political 
commitment made by state, non-state actors and private firms concerning the centrality of 
access to credit in contemporary society that grants platforms a certain infrastructural 
quality. This includes in large part financial inclusion initiatives that implicitly or explicitly 
seek to promote access to credit.  
The STS-inspired approach to infrastructures invites an analysis of how new and 
old socio-technical systems combine to constitute basic enabling functions that tend to be 
taken for granted and assumed (Bowker and Star 1994; Star 1999; Edwards 2003). This 
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lens allows for a move away from the narrow study of actors in finance, such as private 
firms or state institutions, who can straightforwardly be modelled as rational actors whose 
decisions produce outcomes that are directly observable with the correct empirical lens. 
Rather, as in this article, the STS approach to infrastructures can be mobilised to consider 
the complex ways in which financial activity is assembled through people, practices and 
non-human objects, including but not limited to new financial technologies. This speaks 
to the important starting point that markets are made through specific market-making 
practices and technologies and do not naturally or spontaneously occur. This latter 
argument is well-established in IPE, particularly in work inspired by the Social Studies of 
Finance and related fields that analyses how finance is performative (MacKenzie 2006; 
Clarke 2012; Lockwood 2015; Braun 2016). The productive conversation with STS-
inspired approaches here can help scholars avoid collapsing back into conceptual 
entanglements associated with the material-ideational dualism, and take seriously the 
complex ways in which new financial infrastructures come to be assembled. 
The empirical pay-off of conceiving platforms as infrastructures is two-fold. First, 
the lens applied here shows how platform lending provides an enabling function 
conventionally associated with longer-standing banking systems. It is a combination of 
different old and new socio-technical systems, rather than a revolutionary ‘break’ with 
existing financial forms as much of the hubristic discourse surrounding the industry would 
suggest.  Consequently, claims to the ‘disruptive’ potential of platform lending as a new 
technology-enabled set of practices are problematised and given a more skeptical 
interpretation. This frames the issue less in terms of ‘novelty’ and ‘uniqueness’ and more 
in terms of contextualising apparent innovation within previous ‘finnovations’ and the 
‘installed base’ in which they tend to integrate rather than completely replace. Second, the 
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financial inclusion policies that are entangled with the design and operation of platform 
lending are conceived less in terms of actors ‘doing things’ and more in terms of a set of 
discourses, practices and socio-technical systems that can, but do not necessarily, serve to 
reproduce contemporary financialised capitalism. This draws attention to what tend to be 
the backgrounded or obscured politics of claims to infrastructure, in the sense that the 
socio-technical systems that are deemed to constitute the infrastructure are not so inherently 
due to their nature, but are the result of political argument over what is categorised as 
‘basic’ to society (Larkin 2013).  
In sum, the infrastructure lens invites analysis of platform lending in terms of: (1) 
its socio-technical formation, in particular with regards to the potential centrality of financial 
practices; (2) its relational position as a set of actors, technical objects and socio-economic 
practices with regards to the potential facilitation and obscurity characteristics of 
infrastructures; and (3) its integration within other socio-technical systems with regards to 
the apparent durability of existing financial infrastructures. The potential of platform 
lending to embody these specific features of infrastructure enable financial inclusion 
initiatives conceived as a key function to be undertaken. In the next section I explore how 




The formation and positioning of platform lending 
 
The socio-technical formation of the platform in online lending is built on the proposition 
that the process of financial intermediation can be made more efficient through the 
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application of new digital and mobile internet technologies. Such a claim fits quite neatly 
with (neoliberal) financial inclusion discourses, broadly understood, as they emphasise how 
new ‘disruptive’ financial technology firms can improve the terms of access to financial 
services in order to ‘empower’ consumers and build ‘economic resilience’ (e.g. Carney 
2017; Davis and Braunholtz-Speight 2016). This is typically associated with the notion that 
established banks are, and ought to be, subject to ‘disruption’ so that consumers can receive 
better treatment as both lenders and borrowers. For instance, an IMF staff report suggests 
that mobile access and the internet mark a ‘massive decentralization [that] is opening the 
door to direct person-to-person transactions’ and have ‘profound implications … for 
financial inclusion by permitting “unbanked” consumers in low income countries to access 
financial services for the first time’ (IMF 2017: 11).   
Financial inclusion policy discussions tend to stress the desirability of access to 
credit across economies in the Global North, especially in the US and the UK, as well as 
in development contexts in the image of Muhammad Yunus’s (2006) claim that there exists 
a fundamental human right to credit. While financial inclusion policy initiatives have been 
circulating since at least the mid-2000s, there has been a more recent qualitative shift in the 
apparent reach of such policies in light of the emergence of new financial technologies. 
This can be directly linked to the pronounced optimism surrounding alternative finance 
growth in terms of total volumes, albeit from a very low base, in places such as the Middle 
East and Africa (CCAF 2018a: 8). A key development in this area, as Daniela Gabor and 
Sally Brooks (2017: 425) point out, is the way in which ‘the rapid diffusion of mobile 
technologies in developing countries provides the technological infrastructure through 
which financial providers … can “reach the unbanked” and shape financial subjectivities’. 
Platforms operating in the Global North also operate with business models built on 
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broadening the pool of potential borrowers as customers for online lending products. 
Indeed, major international conferences on platform lending, such as the LendIt Fintech 
series that holds annual conferences across the US, Europe and China, have research and 
presentation streams exclusively focused on the issue of how new financial technologies 
can address the ostensible problem of financial exclusion on a global scale.  
The line of reasoning that drives such a narrative, prevalent in business and much 
academic commentary on alternative finance, is essentially that new firms enter a market 
which drives down costs and helps improve market-based competition. In a general and 
popular sense, ‘digital disruption’ echoes a very familiar line of argument about 
Schumpeterian creative destruction. The banks were in crisis, the reasoning goes, and out 
of that crisis a new set of credit providers are emerging. The socio-technical formation of 
the platform simply adds a techno-utopian edge to the claim that competitive financial 
markets are desirable and achievable. The utopianism here is that markets can be perfected 
in terms of providing more complete information, associated with the ostensible advances 
to be made in pricing credit risk discussed below, and in terms of automating human 
decision-making in ways that overcome existing inefficiencies. Moreover, while banks have 
been criticised for their role in expanding the money supply through the fractional reserve 
model, in turn fuelling credit bubbles, platform lending is celebrated for more efficiently 
distributing as opposed to expanding the money supply (Steve Keen cited in Tuckwell 
2017). 
However, the strategic claim to disintermediation is one that has been put forward 
numerous times over several recent decades. As Shaun French and Andrew Leyshon (2004: 
265) point out, the concept of disintermediation was used to describe processes of financial 
service restructuring in the 1980s and featured prominently in discussions of the ‘new 
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economy’ in the 1990s. The way in which platform lending is produced in conceptual terms 
is significant here, akin to how the earlier idea of ‘e-commerce’ was produced by a network 
of particular actors harnessing novel technologies for new market practices (Leyshon et al. 
2005: 440). Narratives that were prevalent in the late 1990s questioned the future of banks 
based on the premise that the existence of intermediaries is a sign that markets are 
inefficient. Given that new technologies of the time could help ‘complete’ markets, 
brokerage and maturity transformation were expected to be rendered redundant (French 
and Leyshon 2004: 281). A very similar narrative surrounds the platform lending industry 
(see, for instance, PWC 2015). 
Several key developments in platform lending deserve recognition at this stage. 
First, it is important to acknowledge the diversity of platform lending models. Platforms 
operating across retail, small business and property lending have distinctly different lending 
practices and target different borrowers. Their socio-technical formation and precise 
techniques of credit assessment (discussed below) vary based on these features, as well as 
their geographical location. Second, as mentioned above, the ‘pure’ P2P lending model 
centred on investors directly allocating their funds by selecting individual borrowers and 
firms has been replaced. As platforms are now mostly responsible for setting interest rates, 
P2P loans have been increasingly produced as a new investor asset class (Aitken 2015a: 
212). Third, the means that platforms use to raise investor funds continue to evolve quite 
rapidly (Aitken 2015b: 846). Institutional funds have replaced ‘ordinary’ individual 
investors on a number of platforms and the growth of secondary markets has been 
substantial, which is celebrated for providing liquidity but which also alters the nature of 
the lending practices. For example, in the US the share of funding sourced from 
institutional investors has overtaken that of private individuals and in 2016 securitisation 
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issuance by platform lenders reached US$9 billion, suggestive of the fact that platform 
lending tends to operate much more like other kinds of conventional lending. Collectively 
these developments change the socio-technical formation of the platform but, in general 
terms, the disintermediation claim remains largely the same. The point still holds that firms 
behind platform lending seek to harness the latest wave of supposed disintermediation and 
their infrastructural qualities, or lack thereof, can be understood within long-standing 
debates about this issue.  
If financial intermediation is conventionally taken to mean the practice of linking 
investors and borrowers to facilitate a ‘going-between’ surplus and deficit economic sectors 
and agents, then disintermediation is the ‘side-stepping’ of these established intermediaries 
themselves (French and Leyshon 2004: 267-268). Platform lending appears to move 
lending circuits off balance sheets and essentially produces platforms as a new type of 
broker. Echoing French and Leyshon’s analysis of the supposed disintermediation 
associated with the new economy, what is more apparent is a process of what they call 
‘reintermediation’. As they put it, ‘new entrants … become intermediaries within value 
chains, albeit more efficient and/or competitive intermediaries than the businesses they 
displaced’ (French and Leyshon 2004: 277). Paralleling the mantra around the new 
economy, platforms appear to be not so much disrupting established financial 
intermediaries through disintermediation as they are reconstituting forms of brokerage 
reintermediation. This is actually quite a simple process of reintermediation, ‘displacing and 
replacing existing intermediaries within value chains’ (French and Leyshon 2004: 280). 
Particularly illustrative of this dynamic is the recent expansion of a balance sheet model of 
platform lending (it represented 78% of US platform debt-based business volume in 2016), 
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which marks a shift in the underlying model that further cements the platform’s central 
role in the loan origination process (CCAF 2017b: 41-42).  
Consequently the relationship between platforms and established financial 
institutions is a complex one in light of the hubristic yet misleading discourses surrounding 
platform lending. On the one hand, platforms attempt to position and differentiate 
themselves from banks by claiming to establish new socio-technical formations that replace 
conventional intermediation. This is certainly the line that industry enthusiasts take who 
dominate discussions of how financial intermediation is changing through the application 
of digital technologies. On the other hand, their actual operation is more like a process of 
reintermediation, not so much replacing banks and other asset managers but working in 
parallel to them. In this latter case, it is perhaps not surprising that several established banks 
are involved in partnerships with platforms, as well as setting up platforms themselves. 
While its emergence is oriented around a discourse of disrupting banks, this might not be 
the most useful way to conceptualise the actual practices involved in platform lending. The 
STS-inspired approach to infrastructures allows for a more sceptical analysis of such claims 
to disruption and invites instead consideration of how new financial technologies and the 
practices they enable are a combination of old and new socio-technical systems.     
Going beyond a narrative about digital disruption reveals how platform lending is 
becoming instituted as a set of financial practices that replicate how many financial 
intermediaries already attempt to capture a certain powerful infrastructural quality. As 
Adam Harmes (1999: 100) suggests, critical scholars of finance should not blindly follow 
the neoclassical view that essentially implies that disintermediation erodes the ‘financial 
hegemony’ of banks because what is equally as likely is a reconfiguration of investment 
decision-making towards other forms of centralisation. Indeed financial reintermediation 
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has been called ‘a highly charged political process that favours some (richer) actors over 
others’ (French and Leyshon 2004: 277). This is seemingly also applicable to the case of 
platform lending. 
It is here where it is possible to identify the crucial intersection between the 
emergence of apparently novel financial technologies and financial inclusion initiatives. As 
has been well-documented, financial inclusion promises a world of ‘empowerment’, 
‘democratisation’ and ‘financial security’ (Bernards 2016; Marron 2013; Soederberg 2014). 
Such discourses work with and alongside interest in platform lending in the ways it is 
positioned as a new means through which to democratise credit access and empower 
financial consumers (e.g. Carney 2017). National financial regulators and international 
financial institutions have a large role to play in furthering this positioning (e.g. BIS/FSB 
2017). A notable example of this trend is the use of ‘regulatory sandboxes’ with the explicit 
intention of ‘live testing’ financial innovations by private firms that might improve financial 
inclusion (CCAF 2018b; IMF 2017: 17; Jenik and Lauer 2017). Housed at the World Bank, 
the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) documents and promotes their use 
because, according to them, ‘[i]n the financial inclusion arena, a regulatory sandbox can 
open space for positive change through innovation’ (Jenik and Lauer 2017: 10). Specifically, 
the CGAP lists countries as diverse as Bahrain, India, Malaysia and Sierra Leone as having 
set up such regulatory schemes specifically on the issue of fostering financial inclusion 
through financial innovation (Jenik and Lauer 2017: 10). The very use of regulatory 
sandboxes in this way suggests there is a degree of state-firm cooperation over the goals of 
financial inclusion policies and the sorts of strategies that should be pursued to try to 
achieve them. 
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The crucial issue is that this specific set of relations gives the platforms significant 
state-endorsed power in the financial circuits that they enable. It is of course no secret that 
regulators see part of their role as legitimating financial innovation.  For instance, the IMF 
(2017: 15) recognises that ‘regulation plays a central role in establishing trust’ including but 
not limited to the signalling of the ‘resilience of counterparties, markets, and infrastructure’. 
Likewise, the BIS/FSB (2017: 35) see the rationale of regulation to be to ‘support 
confidence, growth and innovation in FinTech credit over the longer term’. However, 
while done in the name of competition and ‘free[ing] up the forces that drive innovation 
in the interests of consumers’ (Woolard cited in CCAF 2018b: 9), the firms involved are 
being granted a large degree of power. This matters because rather than working to provide 
financial democratisation and consumer empowerment, which are foundational organising 
principles in financial inclusion policy initiatives attempting to allow equal access for all to 
financial services, platform lending appears to be tending more towards centralisation and 
monopoly.  
This issue relates to the broader tension between the apparent ‘invisibility’ of the 
platform and the economic interactions that it facilitates as infrastructure (Langley and 
Leyshon 2016). Critical readings of platform and mobile app organisation point to how 
they follow a logic of centralisation of ownership (Rosamond 2016: 114). Three core 
observations can be made about the centralising tendencies in platform lending. First, the 
‘scaling-up’ of operations is drastically changing those who are able to participate in the 
networks enabled. As the FCA (2016: 35) reports, the influx of institutional money – 
including from asset managers, banks, hedge funds, insurance companies and pension 
funds – is squeezing out the individual lenders who pool their ‘modest contributions’ in 
the original P2P lending model. In this sense, the socio-technical formation of the platform 
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reproduces the social relations found in other financial market activities and removes the 
supposed levelling effect of harnessing online networks. Second, despite relatively low 
barriers to entry, there is evidence to suggest that the platform lending sector itself is highly 
concentrated. In the countries where it is most established, the UK and the US, the market 
share of the largest platforms is 68% and 80% respectively (BIS/FSB 2017: 9). Third, the 
rise of the securitisation of platform lending loans increases the ‘interconnectedness’ 
between platforms, banks and capital markets (BIS/FSB 2017: 32). Platforms are involved 
in standardising their credit obligations in such a way as to make them available for active 
trading. Consequently, irrespective of the original specific design, purpose or unique 
technology that an individual platform might use, the securitisation process turns platform 
lending into a more traditional asset class. 
However, notably, platforms still appear to succeed in producing a polished veneer 
that detracts from these underpinning transactions at play. Platform lending firms use 
dashboard interfaces to associate themselves with a Silicon Valley aesthetic and the user-
consumer experience is invested in heavily in order to create forms of platform brand 
attachment. This is part of how in ‘app-based’ banking there is ‘the potential to allow the 
social and even affective or emotional relationship between banks and their creditors and 
debtors to become deeper, more profound, more granular, more personal’ (Tiessen: 2015: 
875). This can be understood as a crucial aspect of infrastructure’s ‘political address’; that 
is, ‘the way technologies come to represent the possibility of being modern, of having a 
future, or the foreclosing of that possibility and a resulting experience of abjection’ (Larkin 
2013: 333). 
In sum, the rise of the platform in the digital economy is typically understood in 
policy and regulatory circles to be to benefit of the consumer. This is celebrated because it 
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is deemed to be advancing financial inclusion. Platforms appear to provide a socio-
technical formation at the heart of a disintermediation drive and position themselves 
against incumbents as ‘disruptors’. However, crucially, while the business models 
associated with platform lending promise a marketised process of disruption, what they 
actually deliver is a form of reintermediation that has potentially centralising tendencies. In 
this sense, platforms depend on capturing infrastructural qualities for their continuing 
success, even if those qualities are largely derived from state-sanctioned financial inclusion 
initiatives as opposed to anything else. In the final section of this article I turn to the most 
significant consequences of their formation and positioning as part of the ‘necessary 
infrastructure’ of credit provision.  
 
 
Platform lending as financial inclusion 
 
All data is credit data. This increasingly common phrase (see Aitken 2017; Rosamond 2016) 
was uttered – and indeed featured as the animating principle that informed the majority of 
company presentations, demonstrations and keynote talks – at a major online lending 
conference in San Francisco in 2016. For the majority of attendees this was a fundamental 
and enticing idea for their industry and one that was to ensure the rapid expansion and 
lasting success of their businesses. Operating on the assumption that access to credit is an 
infrastructural issue, platforms were keen to position themselves as uniquely capable of 
promoting the financial inclusion goal of improving access to credit using a vast array of 
credit data. Platforms emphasise their ability to generate new digital data sources for credit-
scoring, even for those potential borrowers with little or no conventional entries into 
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credit-scoring systems. Mirroring the exuberance of many early stage industries associated 
with technological change, the industry claims to be at the forefront of what can be ‘known’ 
about credit allocation.  
Previous research on credit-scoring identified a ‘quantitative revolution’ in the ways 
that retail banks were able to visualise their potential customers (Leyshon and Thrift 1999: 
440; see also Bernards, this issue). In short, the emphasis shifted from local branch-based 
knowledge to the construction of risk profiles ‘at-a-distance’ using databases and credit-
scoring software. Central to this process was an appeal to the possibility of developing 
‘universal measures of social action’, which were in turn dependent on ‘a strong attachment 
to positivism and a belief in the power of predictive science’ (Leyshon and Thrift 1999: 
451). While retail banks developed strong links with credit-scoring consultancies, platforms 
have developed their own credit-scoring technologies in-house based on the digital data 
sources they can capture directly from their users. The particular socio-technical formation 
of the platform means that credit-scoring technologies have been at the heart of their 
operations since their inception. As primarily online entities, this has been accompanied 
with innovations in the collection, use and manipulation of ‘new’ digital data. These 
innovations are associated with the rise and deployment of the possibilities of Big Data 
and depend on both a broadening and deepening of access to information produced by 
online and mobile activities, including but not limited to those that would normally be 
considered ‘economic’ or ‘financial’ (see Langevin, this issue). 
The STS-inspired approach to infrastructures guards against interpretations that 
fetishize the socio-technical formations themselves and helps to situate how the use of new 
forms of digital data collection relates to previous periods of advances in quantitative 
credit-scoring. Platform lending perhaps involves an adaptation rather than a revolution in 
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existing practices, as the platform operates as an additional layer in the calculative process 
of managing credit. As the BIS/FSB (2017: 4) working group point out, platform lending 
is making ‘more intensive use of digital innovations’ than incumbent lending institutions.  
Traditional banks and other lenders are also continually updating their credit-scoring 
practices, but the extent to which platform lending and emerging digital data sources are 
intertwined is significant. As Zopa (2017 emphasis added) outlines: ‘We’ve earned our 
reputation as an innovator by obsessing about tech [and] data’. Certainly, discussions at major 
online lending conferences such as LendIt Fintech are often oriented about the inventive 
use of digital data generated through Internet activity. The platform lending industry has 
embraced the move towards ‘real-time’ analysis of customer behaviour in this regard, such 
as of online spending decisions or current account balance status, so that payment 
‘capability’ can be measured ostensibly with ever-more accuracy. Two important 
implications of these practices are intertwined with financial inclusion initiatives. First, 
adaptations in techniques of credit-scoring and, second, an intensification of the 






The BIS/FSB (2017: 26) working group reports that a crucial determinant of the success 
of platform lending is its ability to provide assessments of credit risk that can deliver 
acceptable risk-adjusted returns. It also states that proponents of platform lending boast 
of how ‘an effective use of big data analytics – including certain non-traditional mass data 
 30 
sources – can improve borrower screening’ (BIS/FSB 2017: 26). Such a claim should be 
immediately problematised given that some industry insiders also openly admit that the 
data sources they are working with are not necessarily most appropriately conceived as Big 
Data, though the loose association helps to build a platform’s brand nonetheless. 
Meaningful evidence of the success of platform credit-scoring practices are difficult to 
ascertain, especially given that platform lending has not gone through a full ‘credit cycle’, 
but one notable indicator is that some established banks such as JPMorgan, BBVA and 
ING have arrangements whereby they can use proprietary platform lending credit risk 
models for their own lending (BIS/FSB 2017: 26). 
Platform lending is arguably adapting current practices of credit-scoring. Emily 
Rosamond (2016: 115) usefully points out that: ‘In an era of fintech, quantitatively assessing 
“character,” institutionalized as risk assessment, takes on new proportions and new 
algorithmic witnesses’. In this sense, ‘algorithmic governance’ becomes an important 
concept (Campbell-Verduyn, Goguen and Porter 2017) and a recognition that computer 
code is ‘simultaneously technical and social, and material and symbolic’ (Berry 2012: 282). 
The novel use of digital data sources is often replacing FICO scores and credit bureaus. 
The positioning of the consumer as a ‘virtual entity, defined by a set of information fields’ 
(Leyshon and Thrift 1999: 440), appears to be emulated and augmented in platform lending 
practices. Just as the commercial success of retail bank lending operations came to rely on 
the ability to generate information that could identify ‘good’ borrowing customers, 
platform lending has come to be oriented around the harnessing of digital data sources for 
ever-more fine-grained analysis of borrower capability. Such analysis is built on the use of 
non-standard data for credit decisions, such as analysis of online social networks, digital 
footprints and mobile smartphone use. The premise is that improved access to data sources 
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and the mass of information that people willingly give to others through their internet use 
can help platforms make better credit decisions. The following vignettes help illustrate the 
use of digital data sources in credit-scoring procedures in platform lending.  
A former employee working as a data scientist at a UK platform explained how 
their role was heavily focused on analysing how potential borrowers interacted with their 
website. In part, this analysis was put towards the design of marketing strategies that could 
target borrowers to convince them to use the site to apply for credit. Yet it was also put 
towards the task of assessing borrower risk through what is described as the incorporation 
of ‘non-traditional’ data. This was the key technological innovation that the platform saw 
itself as pursuing as a digital data rich company. Similarly, on a panel at a major US online 
lending conference dedicated to the theme of innovating business models, the core point 
of agreement amongst panellists was that while the first phase of platform lending was the 
proposition that lending could be taken online to make it cheaper through improved 
efficiencies, the second and crucial growth phase was based on the value proposition that 
as online firms they are uniquely positioned to exploit the ‘data-based technology’ on which 
they are built.  
In critical terms, these trends can be interpreted in the context of previous attempts 
to improve credit-scoring methods. The longer-standing narrative surrounding the 
adoption of such technologies was one of a ‘triumph of the unquestionable efficiency of 
risk scoring over the relative inefficiency of human “judgmental” decision-making’ 
(Marron 2007: 113). Notably, these shifts towards ‘technocratic’ and ‘statistical expertise’ 
were ‘given official sanction by the state through legislation as a means of guaranteeing 
equality of opportunity to the market according to the individual’s capacity for self-
government’ (Marron 2007: 104).  
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In this context, the US platform Upstart provides a particularly illuminating 
example of the use of digital data analytics. Started by ‘ex-Googlers’, Upstart claims to be 
‘the first lending platform to leverage artificial intelligence and machine learning to price 
credit and automate the borrowing process’ and has originated more than US$2 billion in 
loans (Upstart 2018). At a conference panel on consumer lending in 2016, the Upstart 
presentation opened with the announcement ‘Welcome to a Post-FICO World’. This claim 
was built on the idea that consumer credit modelling data and methods ‘haven’t changed 
in decades’ and could be improved through a ‘disruptive credit model’ based on ‘unique 
predictive data, better math, and faster learning’. Upstart claims to have ‘assembled a 
collection of variables that are more predictive than the entire credit bureau file’, which 
includes listed variables that related to fine-grained details about training and education 
such as ‘employer, work experience, degrees, schools, GPA, test scores, job offers and cost 
of living’. The credit model apparently goes beyond the ‘black/white decision logic’ and 
‘simple regression’ of traditional methods to include ‘continuous decision logic, cross-
validated logistic regression, higher-order variables, random forest, Monte Carlo methods, 
[and] ensemble learning’. The headline claim about such innovation is that ‘success in our 
case means reducing the price of credit to 65 million underserved borrowers’. To be clear, 
this is a claim that should be treated with scepticism. The point is to show the degree of 
exuberance attached to the ability to master credit risk, which builds on previous hubris 
surrounding risk management technologies, and how this is framed in terms of being able 
to apply financial technologies to the goal of furthering access to credit. 
However, undoubtedly some of the costs of social provisioning will overflow the 
calculative practices contained within the risk models used by the platforms. I borrow the 
term ‘provisioning’, activities intended to meet social needs, from Dave Elder-Vass’ (2016: 
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32) consideration of the digital economy. The use of differentiated pricing for borrowers 
does very little to alter or challenge pre-existing social problems and hierarchies, and under 
such circumstances the policing of defaults is exceptionally important. In this regard, while 
little is known about how defaults are managed in platform lending, most indications point 
to similar systems as those found in other forms of consumer credit. Notably, industry 
events tend not to talk about the process of dealing with defaulting customers, instead 
focusing on default rates in general terms and any associated techniques that might protect 
investors from potential losses. Meanwhile platforms seem to do their utmost to cover 
losses to avoid the negative publicity that comes with higher default rates. What is known 
is that in the context of promoting financial inclusion, incorporation will remain limited 
because it is more often than not contradictory and uneven (see Bernards, this issue).  
Online digital constructions of credit-scoring have the ability to both empower and 
disempower certain individuals and groups. The use of non-traditional mass data sources 
certainly allows for previously excluded populations to become financially included. As 
Gabor and Brooks (2016: 425) suggest, though, personal data becomes a market in its own 
right as people use their technology to become financially included. Research with those 
involved with the platform lending industry specifically suggests that this is the case, 
especially when it comes to designing business models that encourage people to allow their 
data to be used for digital credit-scoring. Consumers may willingly allow their personal 
information to be collected if this helps them accrue creditworthiness, but as with practices 
in the data broker industry more broadly, ordinary people ‘do not have a lot of choice in 
what or how much personal information is gathered, its accuracy, or how it is being used 




Credit provision infrastructures 
 
The prospects for financial inclusion through platform lending take on an additional 
dimension in the Global South. For instance, credit bureau coverage is often incomplete 
in many low-income countries and primarily cash-based economies tend to have limited 
tax records, which present problems in terms of ‘including’ people into the formal financial 
realm if credit risk cannot be assessed using such information sources. As a result, the data 
associated with and generated by platform lending allow for platforms to build datasets 
from scratch. The range of non-traditional digital data that can be used for such a task is 
vast and is not an area of growth limited to platform lending alone. Accion (2017: 29-33) 
provides a global mapping of business models that are based on harnessing such data 
sources, which include digital footprints on sites such as Alibaba, smartphone application 
scans, call data records, mobile repayment behaviour, social media activity, and real-time 
business performance and assessment of individual applicant behaviour. The perceived key 
promise for advancing financial inclusion for organisations such as CGAP is that they 
provide ‘the possibility of assessing credit risk of people for whom no information or 
formal records exist, allowing many to establish a formal credit history and to eventually 
engage more broadly with formal financial service providers’ (Chen and Faz 2015: 1). This 
outlook was corroborated by a founder and CEO of an Indian platform lending firm who 
suggested that new borrowers could be served by their firm who would not have access to 
bank loans because of a lack of formal traditional data about them (anonymous interview 
2016). 
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 Moreover, faith in forms of ‘smarter’ credit-scoring technology allows firms to 
increase their number of borrowing customers while claiming to lower rather than increase 
default rates. A former investment banker expressed concern that there were no limits to 
the risk levels platform lenders would take on: you just have to get the risk-based price right 
(anonymous interview 2016). The only barrier is seemingly data ‘quality’ and ‘cleanness’. 
Sympathetic commentators celebrate a shift from ‘negative’ to ‘positive’ borrower selection 
practices on these terms: using the credit assessment models to find a reason to say ‘yes’ to 
extending a loan. As a form of risk pricing, such practices go beyond a binary conception 
of acceptance or rejection, towards a scale on which interest rates and terms are set based 
on the applicant’s risk attributes (Marron 2007: 122). In such an approach, there are no 
longer ‘bad’ risks, so lending firms should become more ‘entrepreneurial’ in their 
‘downward targeting of consumers’ such that previously excluded consumers can be 
brought into formal mechanisms of debt ‘on differential terms’ (Marron 2007: 124).  
Finally, it is notable that platforms tend to operate on a fee-based model that 
requires them to capture the network effects of online activity and essentially facilitate more 
and more loans. In simple terms, they have huge reason to seek to expand their potential 
pool of borrowers. This is particularly the case given that ‘the demand for P2P loans by 
institutional money is far outstripping supply’ and despite rapid growth ‘loan volumes are 
not growing fast enough to keep up with yield-hungry investors’ (FCA 2016: 35). Platform 
lending has an in-built tendency to encourage borrowing, potentially further fuelling debt 
growth in a number of already heavily indebted national economic contexts such as in the 
US where household indebtedness continues to grow. Whether financial inclusion is 
desirable and achievable or not, what is remarkable is the way in which access to credit 
conceived as infrastructure allows platforms to attach themselves to particular cultural 
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trends. In this case, they are able to pursue both an intensification of credit-scoring 
technologies so that they penetrate an increasing amount of everyday life and an expansion 
of a potential pool of borrowers needed for their model by drawing on the state-endorsed 
policy goals of financial inclusion. The politics of emergent financial infrastructures are laid 
bare when one can begin to unpack their socio-technical formation and relational 






In this article, I have provided a critical engagement with the technologies, practices and 
firms involved with the so-called digital disruption of finance, with particular reference to 
platform lending. I have suggested that: first, an infrastructural lens is a useful approach to 
adopt when attempting to account for the socio-technical formation of platform lending 
and its positioning in finance; second, financial inclusion, broadly understood, plays an 
important role in attempts by platforms to situate themselves as ‘infrastructural’, based on 
notions of how credit providers are foundational to contemporary modes of living; and, 
finally, the entanglement of platform lending and financial inclusion produces potentially 
harmful developments in credit-scoring technologies and facilitates the intensification of 
the financialisation of everyday life and social provisioning. If traditional financial 
infrastructures are correctly deemed to be productive of social distance and inequality, then 
more recent digital technologies have, in principle, the ability to decrease that distance and 
enable more responsible forms of finance (Coeckelbergh 2016: 169). However, the 
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particular connections between the socio-technical formation and relational positioning of 
platform lending and other longstanding infrastructures might be at least in part 
responsible for limiting this potential. Financial inclusion initiatives present certain 
opportunities and constraints for backers and designers of emerging financial technologies. 
I submit that financial inclusion has helped skew those technologies towards perfecting 
problematic and potentially harmful forms of credit-scoring techniques, as well as towards 
attempts to expand the pool of potential borrowers with little regard for the sustainability 
of those credit-debt relations.  
 Furthermore, it is worth reflecting on how IPE studies of platform economies in 
general and platform lending in particular might evolve, particularly in light of the 
productive conversations to be had with the STS-inspired studies of financial 
infrastructures. One area of note, which has been left largely in the background of this 
article, is the potential openness characteristic of infrastructures. That is, as the editors of this 
special issue outline, infrastructures ‘do not have to be reinvented each time or assembled 
for each task’ (Star cited in Bernards and Campbell-Verduyn, this issue). They are ‘open’ 
to be used, with varying capabilities, by a range of different people with diverse political 
and normative commitments in mind. In this sense, it is important to acknowledge that the 
socio-technical formation of the platform is not fixed, but open to repurposing and reuse 
in experimental and sometimes inventive ways (Tooker and Clarke 2018). Further avenues 
for IPE research thus include for instance efforts to develop more ‘pro-social’ platforms, 
such as those found within platform cooperative networks. While platforms are likely to 
be involved in a degree of integration with the ‘installed base’ of existing capitalist socio-
technical devices and social relations, there is also always the possibility of reimagining their 
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